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The challenge, therefore, is not to destroy the patterns of the past. It is to 
retain those aspects which have enabled the country to progress but to 
ensure that all can enjoy them.
By Steven Friedman
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For some, the story of the past two decades is one of great change. To others, it is about how two 
decades of democracy have changed 
nothing. In a sense, both are right. 
Supporters of the first view will 
point out that, over the past two 
decades, opportunities have opened 
up for millions who were denied them 
by apartheid. We now have the black 
middle class which some apartheid 
strategists hoped to create but never 
did; most South Africans have the right 
to vote, to speak and be heard which 
they were denied. Opportunities 
which were once closed by racial laws 
have opened and millions have social 
grants which enable them not only to 
escape poverty but to participate in 
the economy. Those who make this 
argument are right.
Advocates of the second view 
will note that the essential economic 
patterns of the society remain 
unchanged: we are still a society of 
insiders and outsiders. Although not all 
the insiders are white now, just about 
all the outsiders are still black. This 
view is also right.
There is an academic term which 
helps us to describe this seemingly 
contradictory reality: the economic 
historian Douglass North’s idea ‘path 
dependence’, which describes how, 
in societies which experience great 
change, the patterns of the past can 
survive. North believed that societies 
adopted routines, social connections 
and ways of seeing the world which 
were very difficult to change even if 
much else changed.  That seems an 
accurate way to describe South Africa 
after two decades of democracy. 
We can express the same idea 
in more simple terms by seeing the 
country as a society which, in 1994, was 
governed by an exclusive white club. 
Over the last two decades, a sizeable 
number of black members have been 
admitted and they enjoy most of the 
privileges of membership. But the club 
remains exclusive and so most citizens 
still find themselves on the outside. The 
story of two decades of democracy has 
not been the ‘negotiated revolution’ 
which some academics saw but the 
absorption of part of the black majority 
into the institutions which once served 
a minority.
The club’s survival is not purely 
negative – it has ensured that many 
of the opportunities and advantages 
which apartheid restricted to whites 
are now available to many more. But it 
continues to limit the society’s capacity 
to grow – economically, socially and 
culturally. The challenge, therefore, is 
not to destroy the patterns of the past. 
It is to retain those aspects which have 
enabled the country to progress but to 
ensure that all can enjoy them. Failure 
to do this will force us to ‘muddle 
through‘, avoiding disaster but failing 
to reach our potential.
A Place for Some: Inside the Club   
At first glance, it may seem odd 
to see achievements since 1994 
as a continuation of the old order. 
Apartheid was a system of racial 
domination which denied most citizens 
the most basic of rights. Whatever 
its weaknesses, the post-1994 order 
has allowed all adults a vote and has 
respected the formal freedoms of all 
its citizens. It has offered citizens who 
were once dominated because they 
were black access to resources and 
opportunities which they were denied. 
How can any of this be a continuation 
of the past?
The question seems unanswerable 
until we remember that apartheid was 
an order in which a racial minority 
dominated the majority. And this 
meant that members of the minority – 
whites – enjoyed something close to a 
functioning democracy and, for many 
years, very generous benefits from the 
state. 
Whites could vote and form political 
parties – power changed hands at 
the ballot box in 1924 and 1948. 
They enjoyed full economic rights, 
despite some ethnic patronage which 
advantaged Afrikaners, and, for much 
of the period after 1948, a generous 
whites-only welfare state. While 
repressive laws affected everyone in 
theory, in practice whites enjoyed a fair 
degree of freedom unless they actively 
supported the liberation movements 
(in which case they became, in the 
eyes of the system, almost black). The 
legal system may have been oppressive 
to black people but it operated well for 
most whites. 
If we see apartheid in this light, 
we can see much of the freedoms of 
the past two decades as an extension 
to everyone of that which only the 
minority enjoyed – even the much-
debated labour relations system of the 
democratic era is largely the system 
introduced for white workers in 1924 
extended to all workers. (Labour 
relations specialists point out that the 
only new feature was the introduction 
of workplace forums, based on a 
similar system in Germany – they have 
hardly been used, presumably because 
both unions and employers prefer to 
tread the familiar path than branch out 
in new directions).
It is not hard to see why the 
majority’s leadership wanted to seek 
inclusion in what already existed rather 
than to try to create something new. 
Besides the obvious reality that the old 
order had resources which the new 
one needed, apartheid worked very 
well for whites and it was only natural 
for the leadership of the black majority 
to aspire to what the minority had. If 
no-one had voted before 1994, black 
people may not have braved huge 
queues for days to vote – they insisted 
on casting their ballot because everyone 
was claiming what only some had until 
then had. More generally, political 
leadership sought to claim for everyone 
what whites alone had enjoyed. And so 
the country’s racial dynamics ensured 
that those routines and ways of seeing 
which North noticed persisted into the 
new formally non-racial order.
This process was helped by the fact 
that much of what whites enjoyed had 
been developed not by the Afrikaner 
Nationalist government elected in 
1948, but by British colonisation which, 
while it too refused to recognise black 
Apartheid  
patterns, which drove 
the black poor onto 
the edges of the cities, 
far from the economic 
action, continue, 
enforced now not by 
bureaucrats but by 
land markets.
T H E  T H I N K E R24
POLITICS
people as equals, did maintain formal 
freedoms such as independence for 
the courts and the media. And so the 
leadership of the new democracy’s 
attempt to ensure that what whites 
monopolised was extended to all 
could rely on restoring what had been 
available before 1948.   
This pattern has ensured two 
decades in which institutions which 
ensure basic freedoms for all have faced 
no serious challenge - parliament, the 
courts, the media and the universities 
all enjoy those freedoms and powers 
British colonialism claimed to uphold. 
But apartheid and colonisation were 
never meant to be for everyone. And, 
while it has been feasible to extend to 
everyone the formal rights which only 
whites once enjoyed, it has not been 
possible to ensure that most people 
enjoy whites’ apartheid-era economic 
and social life. Trying to extend 
minority privilege to the majority has 
preserved many of the patterns which 
underpinned racial minority rule.
Insiders and Outsiders
The social and economic impact of 
trying to extend to all what apartheid 
offered to whites can be illustrated by 
an incident in the last years of apartheid 
which, in a sense, set the pattern for 
the period after 1994.
Alexandra township, in northern 
Johannesburg, had been one of the few 
areas where black people were allowed 
to own property. Since apartheid 
decreed that blacks could not own land 
in the ‘white’ cities, it was anathema to 
the system’s planners and so ‘Alex’ was 
doomed to become the site of single-sex 
worker hostels. A residents’ committee 
was formed to resist this – it used 
imaginative tactics to force an apartheid 
government which had already begun 
its retreat to abandon its plans and 
recognise the right of black people to 
continue to own property there. 
The committee, eager to seal 
its victory, insisted that Alexandra 
become a ‘garden suburb’ modelled 
on neighbouring Sandton. Town 
planners told them that, because Alex 
was too small to accommodate most 
of its residents, this would displace 
thousands from their homes. They 
advised against trying to turn Alex into a 
replica of Sandton. The committee was 
offended – garden suburbs were good 
enough for whites, it noted, why were 
blacks not entitled to the same? And so 
the plan went ahead – thousands were 
indeed displaced, a decade of conflict 
began and it is debatable whether 
‘Alex’ has fully recovered.
By insisting on a garden suburb, the 
residents’ committee was demanding 
equal treatment for all. But because 
what it wanted had been designed 
only for a few, its understandable stand 
of principle caused exclusion and 
conflict. By accepting and aspiring to a 
privileged minority’s standards, it kept 
exclusion alive in a new form.
Much the same could be said of 
the entire society since 1994. Many 
black people now enjoy access to 
that from which previous generations 
were excluded. But the economic 
pecking orders which existed before 
1994 still lives. Income inequality has 
not changed dramatically - and it still 
bears a racial tinge: white incomes 
have increased fastest. Black South 
African investors own only a fraction 
of the available share capital in the top 
100 listed companies, the professions 
remain largely white. Figures on 
poverty are contested, but it remains 
uncomfortably high.
Perhaps the most obvious economic 
symptom of our past is the widespread 
problem of ‘unsecured lending’ – 
which means, simply, that people 
borrow money they can’t repay. There 
are two reasons for this, one related to 
inequality, the other to poverty. Both 
indicate the persistence of patterns of 
the past.
First, the exclusive club is open only 
to people who can show that they own 
things: and so in this society, owning 
certain kinds of consumer goods show 
that you are worthy of respect. This 
is presumably why the 2011 census 
found that around 1m households own 
a television but not a fridge – people 
who own a TV enjoy higher status than 
those who keep their food fresh. If 
people can’t afford the goods needed 
to earn respect, and they have jobs (and 
sometimes if they don’t), they borrow 
to buy them, even if they cannot afford 
to repay. Second, it is now widely 
accepted that black salaries and wages 
are distributed among unemployed 
family, who are of course excluded 
from the club. This places pressure on 
wages and makes industrial bargaining 
more difficult.
The patterns of our cities also reflect 
the past. Suburbs are not as white as 
they were (although, as voting figures 
show, they remain largely the preserve 
of racial minorities). But apartheid 
patterns, which drove the black 
poor onto the edges of the cities, far 
from the economic action, continue, 
enforced now not by bureaucrats but 
by land markets – affordable land for 
public housing is almost always on the 
margins of cities. 
The political and social patterns of 
the past also continue. In the suburbs, 
people vigorously exercise their 
democratic rights – so much so that to 
say anything positive about government 
in these areas is to invite scorn. In the 
townships and shack settlements, 
local power holders guard their turf, 
sometimes using force to silence 
independent voices – the experience of 
the shack dweller movement Abahlali 
basemjondolo, which faced severe 
violence after challenging the authority 
of local power holders in Durban, is 
only one example. The suburbs may 
vote for the opposition – but they still 
enjoy better services and access to local 
government than the majority who 
vote for the governing party because 
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their residents, like middle class people 
everywhere, know how to ensure that 
their voices are heard.
All this should sound familiar 
to those who remember life under 
apartheid. Then too the poor were 
forced onto the margins of the cities. 
Then too to live in a suburb was to 
enjoy better services and much greater 
freedom to speak. 
Even within the club, if many of its 
new black members are to be believed, 
the patterns of the past continue since 
the white members enjoy a status which 
blacks who have been admitted are 
denied. Many in the black middle class, 
although they enjoy qualifications, job 
and incomes which were denied their 
parents and grandparents, are among 
the angriest South Africans because 
they complain that their qualifications 
have not brought them equal treatment 
from white businesses and professional 
practices. The fond fantasy that the 
growth of a black middle class would 
dull the edges of racial conflict or 
end it has not been realised – the key 
fault line of the past, race, remains a 
powerful source of division. 
None of this means that nothing 
has changed since 1994. But it does 
confirm the point made earlier – that the 
essential patterns of the past remain and 
that they continue to block progress.
The Politics of Fitting In 
These trends could be seen as a sign 
that the country is changing, but not 
fast enough. After all, in any society, 
it usually takes decades for social and 
economic change to catch up with its 
political equivalent.
But two factors suggest that the 
problem is not that change takes time 
but that the old ways survive in a new 
guise. The first is the way in which 
politics and trade unionism have 
become not a challenge to minority 
control but a way into it – the second 
is the degree to which attitudes which 
underpinned the exclusion of the past 
survive into the present.
On the first score, politics since 1994 
has often been about the terms under 
which those who led the struggle against 
minority rule are fitted into its economic 
and social structure. Black economic 
empowerment is often not about 
creating new sources of power and 
opportunity, but about the terms under 
which those who fought the system will 
be allowed into the economic elite. The 
old business leadership wants black 
partners – but far too often the criterion 
for admission is not skills and talents but 
political connections. 
This has weakened democratic 
politics, particularly those of the 
governing party. Because access to the 
club is limited – and available first to 
those who have political connections – 
the ambitious predictably seek political 
office in the hope of accessing not only 
the public resources on which media 
commentary dwells but private wealth 
too. Corruption in post-apartheid 
South Africa is not simply a public 
sector problem – it is a public-private 
partnership. It is not, as the owners of 
private wealth often imply, a threat to 
the club but a means of ensuring its 
survival. 
ANC documents repeatedly lament 
the heightened internal conflict which 
this brings and the corroding effect of 
money on internal democracy. And so, 
in a sense, the governing party is itself 
a victim of that which it once fought to 
dismantle.
The trade union movement, which 
seeks to project itself as an antidote to 
these patterns, has increasingly become 
part of the problem. Research has 
shown how unionism has increasingly 
become a ticket into the middle class 
and middle management: union 
investment companies are a vehicle 
for fitting into the reigning economic 
arrangements, not changing them. 
These trends underline the degree 
to which even those who publicly 
challenge arrangements after 1994 
have slotted into that which they claim 
to oppose.       
Prisoners of the Mind  
On the second score, the framework 
through which the society’s priorities 
are viewed is that of the old elite – not 
necessarily that which governed after 
1948 but that which the European 
colonisers brought.
The point is captured by political 
commentator Aubrey Matshiqi’s 
observation that the new political 
majority remains a cultural minority. 
This does not mean simply that whites 
dominate culturally – although that too 
is often a reality. It means, rather, that 
the view of the white suburban elite 
prevails, partly because it is now shared 
with others. 
Media thus reflect the world view 
and experience of the suburban middle 
class, largely ignoring the perspectives 
and experiences of most citizens.   The 
society’s difficulties are blamed not 
on deep-rooted problems embedded 
in the past, but the misdeeds of the 
governing party and its leadership 
since 1994. And the assumptions 
which reign in the media, the academy 
and the professions are those which 
assume, as the political philosopher 
Rick Turner observed,  “that ‘western 
civilisation’ is adequate, and superior 
to other forms, but also that blacks can, 
through education, attain the level of 
western civilisation”.  
Some of this is obvious – a frequent 
tendency to judge South African 
democracy by the standards of a 
largely fictional and idealised version 
of ‘Western democracy’, such as the 
claim in a recent radio debate that the 
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United States, where the unrestrained 
effect of money on politics has placed 
democracy in jeopardy, is a society 
‘in which people have a voice’;  or a 
tendency to assume that when black 
African voters support the governing 
party they do so out of ignorance while 
white voters’ choice of the opposition 
is a rational calculation; or the routine 
failure to acknowledge the voices 
and experiences of the majority in 
townships and shack settlements unless 
they engage in protests which disturb 
the ordered world of the middle class 
– the demonstrations are routinely 
explained away as ‘service delivery 
protests’, excusing opinion-formers 
of the need to find out what they are 
really about.
A less obvious but equally important 
example is the ‘job creation debate’. 
Across the spectrum, the elite is much 
given to debating how their proposals 
can create millions of formal jobs. This 
assumes that it is possible to include 
every adult in the formal working world 
of the club’s members, which is surely 
impossible given a growing mismatch 
between the number of workers 
required by the formal economy and 
the number of job seekers. It assumes 
too that the only possible form of 
employment is in the formal sector, 
so ignoring the many in townships and 
shack settlements who make a living 
on the streets and in backyards. The 
assumption that ‘real work’ occurs 
only in the air conditioned offices of 
the ‘civilised’ prevents a discussion of 
how to support the economic activity 
outside the formal workplace which 
will offer the only route to a productive 
life to millions. 
And so the fantasy that all can enjoy 
the world of work with which club 
members are familiar prevents a debate 
on the real issue – how to ensure 
that people earning a living in the 
environments which the majority know, 
earn a decent living and contribute to 
the economy. This illustrates the wider 
problem – that many of the society’s 
mainstream debates are about how 
to divide up the resources of the club 
and what its membership rules should 
be. They are rarely about how to open 
the club to all. And that ensures that 
job creation is not the only issue on 
which opportunities to find workable 
solutions are missed because the 
conversation inside the club ensures 
that the right questions are never asked 
and workable solutions are therefore 
never found.
The Necessity to Negotiate
What might enable us to ensure that 
the benefits of club membership are 
open to all?
For some, of course, the solution is 
to tear up the compromise of 1994 and 
the constitution it produced because 
it is said to have changed nothing. 
But much has changed – many South 
Africans have acquired opportunities 
which they understandably do not wish 
to lose. And the freedoms guaranteed 
by the constitution are not part of the 
problem – they are part of the solution 
because they offer real rights which 
might enable those excluded from the 
club to claim a place in it. And so the 
challenge is not to dismantle what has 
been built over the past two decades 
– it is, rather, to include all of us in it.
This means that change has to be 
negotiated, rather than imposed – if it 
is simply forced on those who currently 
benefit from the club, this will deprive 
the society of much of what it needs to 
move forward.
For some, this means giving in to those 
who enjoy privileges. But, as the history 
of negotiation in this society shows, this 
ignores the reality that real bargaining 
does not rubber stamp what exists – it 
changes it. Real negotiation on how to 
change our current path would not be 
a love fest between parties chanting 
the usual clichés about how much they 
have in common – it would be a tough 
process in which parties would try 
to give as little as possible and gain 
as much as they can. But, because 
it would require compromise, it 
provides the only prospect of retaining 
what the society needs to keep while 
discarding the patterns which exclude 
so many.
In theory, this process could be 
started by any of the key economic 
actors. In practice, only the government 
seems currently to accept, at least in 
principle, that a new path is needed. 
Not only is it the actor which is most 
directly affected – it could be argued 
that the fact that we remain stuck on 
the same path is the greatest failure of 
the post-1994 government.  
And so whether we negotiate a 
new path or not depends currently 
on whether those who govern 
can begin the process.  Whether we 
have a chance to negotiate a fairer 
and more productive direction will 
therefore depend on whether the 
government is able to develop a 
workable strategy for negotiation and 
can make it stick. ■        
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